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During the past half century, the study of social contention has been cha-
racterized by a division between research on labor movements and studies on 
other social movements. This division also left its mark on the study of modes of 
action: while labor scholars mainly examined strikes, social movement scholars 
have increasingly come to focus on street protests. This article is a contribu-
tion to bridging the gap between the two research areas both on theoretical and 
empirical levels. On a theoretical level, I discuss the usefulness of combining 
economic and political models of contention from the two research areas. On 
an empirical level, I use official data provided by Spanish ministries to examine 
and relate the workers’ use of strikes and street protests between 2000 and 2016 
in Spain. Examining strikes and street protests jointly does not only provide a 
fuller picture, it also helps to discern contrasts and thus the specificities of each 
mode of action.
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RESUMEN
En el último medio siglo, los estudios del conflicto social se han caracter-
izado por una separación entre investigaciones sobre movimientos laborales y 
estudios sobre otros movimientos sociales. Esta división también dejó su marca 
en el estudio de los modos de acción: mientras que las sociólogas y los sociólo-
gos del trabajo examinaban principalmente las huelgas, las y los especialistas en 
movimientos sociales se han centrado cada vez más en las protestas callejeras. 
Este artículo es una contribución para cerrar la brecha entre las dos áreas de 
investigación tanto a nivel teórico como empírico. A nivel teórico, se discute la 
utilidad de combinar modelos económicos y políticos del conflicto social de las 
dos áreas de investigación. A nivel empírico, se utilizan datos oficiales propor-
cionados por ministerios españoles para examinar y relacionar el uso de huelgas 
y manifestaciones callejeras por parte de los trabajadores entre 2000 y 2016 en 
España. El examen combinado de las huelgas y las protestas callejeras no sólo 
proporciona una imagen más completa, sino que también ayuda a discernir los 
contrastes y, por lo tanto, las particularidades de cada modo de acción.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Movimientos obreros, movimientos sociales, huelgas, manifestaciones, Es-
paña.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Workers go on strike and paralyze production. They call for protests and
take the streets. What is obvious to any trade union activist seems less evident 
within academia, where scientific specialization has resulted in a strong—
although weakening—division between strike research and protest analysis 
(Yon 2016). Scholars of the former research area mainly examine class divisions 
and workplace related conflicts, while scholars of the latter generally focus on 
street protests—and most often on those promoted by non-labor organizations. 
Since the turn of the millennium, an increasing number of scholars has come to 
challenge this separation in the study of labor and non-labor actors and their res-
pective (ascribed) modes of action (Fantasia y Stepan-Norris 2004; Giraud 2009; 
Grote y Wagemann 2019; Yon 2016). Extending the study of labor contention to 
modes of action other than strikes seems particularly relevant with respect to the 
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Spanish case, where workers and unions remain core players in the production 
of social contention in the streets (Luque y González 2017).2
The present article is a contribution to further decompartmentalizing strike 
research and protest analysis. The article builds on previous studies on levels of 
labor contention in the recent history of Spain (Luque 2012; Luque y González 
2017; Pohl 2018). However, it is novel in two ways. First, it broadens the study 
of labor contention by systematically including labor related street protests (i.e. 
those street protests called by workers, works committees or unions). The aim 
here is to provide a better understanding of how strike patterns relate to evolu-
tions of labor protests in the streets. Second, it establishes a theoretical dialogue 
between strike research and protest analysis. Both research areas have in fact 
extensively dealt with factors expected to favor or hinder the emergence of con-
tentious collective actions. Yet, the analyses have remained largely confined to 
the respective research object – either strikes or street protests. In this article, I 
compare the ways in which the two research areas conceptualize economic and 
political factors expected to affect the emergence contentious collective actions. 
To be more precise, I deal with the Business Cycle Model and Grievance Theory 
regarding the economic dimension and the Political Exchange Model and the 
Political Opportunity Perspective for the political dimension. I discuss where the 
respective models coincide and where they diverge and subsequently examine 
their applicability to the Spanish case between 2000 and 2016. 
The study draws on yearly aggregate data on strikes and labor related street 
protests between 2000 and 2016 in Spain. The data on strikes is provided by the 
Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security and the data on street pro-
tests by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior. The operationalization of the data 
is inspired by Shorter and Tilly’s notion of “shapes of strikes” (Shorter y Tilly 
1971; 1974), which allows one to examine the data in relative terms, notably 
by calculating frequencies of strikes and street protests among a the working 
population. 
The study has the great merit of examining relationally two modes of action 
that have often been kept separate. However, the analysis also has some limits, 
which have to be clarified from the outset. Relying on yearly aggregate data 
makes it virtually impossible to produce a fine-grained process-oriented analysis. 
Only very broad year-to-year changes can be examined. To this, one has to add 
the examined theoretical perspectives, which seek to establish general relations-
hips between seemingly ‘external’ (economic or political) factors and the likeli-
hood of contentious collective actions. As a consequence of the aggregate nature 
of the data and the focus on rather macrological theories, the multiple actors as 
2 Conversely, movements not ascribed to organized labor (such as the feminist, the climate 
or the Catalan pro-independence movements) have come to take prominent roles in the production 
of social contention at the workplace, notably by calling general strikes. This issue, however, goes 
beyond the scope of the present article. 
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well as their interactions—or the precise micro- and mesological processes in the 
emergence of contentious collective actions—fade into the background.3
The article is structured as follows: In the first section, I present a brief over-
view of the principal economic and political models used in strike research and 
protest analysis. The second section deals with the official strike and protest data 
as well as with its operationalization. The core section of the article deals with 
the applicability of the different theoretical models to labor related contention in 
Spain between 2000 and 2016. In a concluding section, I discuss how empirica-
lly and theoretically combining strike and protest research can produce further 
insights into the patterns of social contention—in Spain and beyond.
2.  RELATING THEORIES ON INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT WITH
PROTEST THEORY
Scholars of industrial conflict and social movement scholars have extensi-
vely examined ebbs and flows of social contention. These evolutions have often 
been associated with changes in the economic or political context. In this sec-
tion, I present the main theoretical models that have emerged in the two research 
areas.
In strike research, the Business Cycle Model is the principal model relating 
the state of the economy with the occurrence of strikes. While the proxies for 
measuring the state of the economy have varied over time (Knowles 1952; Rees 
1952; Rist 1912; Skeels 1971), the principal argument has essentially remained 
the same: the numbers of strikes are expected to increase in periods of economic 
boom and to decrease in times of economic downturn. Rees (1952: 381) explains 
why strikes are expected to be more frequent in periods of economic prosperity: 
Businesses risk losing market shares and thus become more vulnerable to work 
stoppages. Furthermore, as a consequence of increasing demand and decreasing 
supply of manpower, businesses face more difficulties in hiring new staff. The 
workers, for their part, can rapidly take on a new job if they are dismissed. Un-
der such conditions, workers are likely to protest if their wages do not keep pace 
with economic growth. The author also explains why this process is expected to 
be reversed in periods of economic contraction. When the economy goes down, 
workers participating in strikes (and union activism more broadly) run greater 
risks of being laid off and simultaneously face greater difficulties in finding a 
new job. For the employers, on the other side, it becomes easier to substitute 
laid-off workers. Employers are also expected to be less vulnerable to strikes 
because of full inventories or because lost production can rapidly be made up. 
In such a situation, resorting to strike action is expected to be less effective and 
to entail greater risks for the workers, which is ultimately expected to lead to a 
decrease in numbers of strikes.
3 I have examined such micro- and mesological processes of labor conflicts in previous works 
(Pohl 2020)
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In social movement studies, economic factors for contentious collective ac-
tions have played a more marginal role. The most explicit reference to economic 
cycles can be found in the Relative Deprivation Hypothesis (Davies 1962; Gurr 
1970), which expects rebellions to occur when actual need satisfaction (‘what 
is’) increasingly diverges from expected need satisfaction (‘what should be’). 
After a long period of disregard, the economic dimensions of social contention 
have regained scholarly attention in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Under 
the umbrella of Grievance Theory, scholars started to reconsider ‘economic de-
privation and grievances as drivers of protest’ (Kriesi, Häusermann y Lorenzini 
2020). At a micro level, scholars found a positive relationship between the indi-
viduals’ perception of deprivation and their actual protest participation (Rüdig y 
Karyotis 2014). At a macro level, increasing (general) levels of deprivation have 
been shown to be positively related with protest activity (Kriesi, Häusermann y 
Lorenzini 2020; Quaranta 2015). In this perspective, economic downturns and 
the resulting levels of deprivation are seen as environmental cues for the politi-
cization of the deprivation suffered at the individual level: ‘a visibly deteriorated 
economic context is understood as providing fertile ground for the subjective 
understanding of one’s deprivation as something that can be challenged and re-
dressed collectively and politically’ (Grasso y Giugni 2016: 675-676).
Comparing the Business Cycle Model and Grievance Theory, one finds 
contradictory assumptions regarding the relationship between the state of the 
economy levels of contention. The Business Cycle Model suggests increasing le-
vels of contention when the economy does well, while Grievance Theory expects 
levels of contention to be higher when the economy goes down, and the sharper 
the downturn, the more likely protests become.
Regarding the political dimension of contention, the predominant model in 
strike research is the Political Exchange Model (Hibbs 1978; Pizzorno 1978). 
Introduced by Pizzorno (1978: 279), the notion of political exchange refers 
to the government’s provision of goods (notably labor-friendly policies) in 
exchange for union support. The power of unions and workers in the political 
sphere is here not seen as a function of demand and supply (contrary to the 
Business-Cycle Model). Instead, it is expected to stem from the unions’ capacity 
to withdraw the social consensus and to threaten the established social order. Ac-
cording to Pizzorno (1978: 292), conflict will replace political exchange ‘when 
the unions are either unable or unwilling to exchange moderation for power, and 
either unable or unwilling to prevent new “entries” and the formation of new 
collective identities,’ which are capable of challenging the political order without 
the backing of established unions. 
Later scholars have mainly taken up former hypothesis, according to which 
the degree to which unions moderate their tactics largely depends on the bonds 
they have established with governments (Hibbs 1978; Korpi y Shalev 1979). In 
countries where bonds between government and unions are strong, the latter are 
expected to avoid the costs of strikes and to intervene in the political sphere, 
where they have good chances to attain their goals. Such strong bonds were 
found to be more likely in countries that combined high levels of state interven-
26 N. POHL ON THE USEFULNESS OF COMBINING STRIKE AND PROTEST ... 
EMPIRIA. Revista de Metodología de Ciencias Sociales. N.o 52 septiembre-diciembre, 2021, pp. 21-52.
ISSN: 1139-5737, DOI/ empiria.52.2021.31364
tion with durable social democratic rule—e.g. Norway or Sweden. In contrast, 
in countries where these bonds are weak or absent—e.g. Canada, Ireland or the 
United States—unions have little possibilities to engage in a political exchange 
and conflicts are mainly fought at the company level and notably through stri-
kes (Hibbs 1978; Korpi y Shalev 1979). The probability of an ongoing political 
exchange is affected by other political factors—most notably the presence or 
absence of a sizable Communist party (Hibbs 1976). Where Communist parties 
are strong they are expected to hamper or undo the social democrats’ efforts in 
engaging in a political exchange with unions. 
In social movement studies, political factors for contentious collective ac-
tions have mainly been examined in terms of political opportunities or political 
opportunity structures, which are expected to favor or hinder the emergence of 
social movements and contentious collective actions (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 
et al. 1995; Tarrow 1989). Synthesizing previous conceptualizations, McAdam 
(1996: 27) identifies four broad dimensions of political opportunities for social 
movements: (1) A polity’s degree of openness; (2) the relative stability of alig-
nments between different elite groups within a given political system; (3) the 
availability of influential allies (4) the government’s use of repression against 
social movements. 
Studies of single countries have come to focus on the more ‘configurational’ 
opportunities and notably on the degree of unity on the left, the left’s presence 
(or absence) in government and the left’s (majority or minority) role within the 
government (Kriesi 1995; 2004). Regarding the unity of the left, the action space 
of labor movements is expected to remain large where the left is divided (Kriesi 
1995: 181). Social democrats have to compete for hegemony on the left and 
therefore remain receptive to labor demands. In contrast, the action space of la-
bor movements is expected to be narrower where the left is unified, since social 
democrats shift their attention to issues related to new challengers. 
Regarding the participation in government, left-wing protest mobilization is 
expected to be higher under right-wing than under left-wing governments (Koo-
pmans y Rucht 1995; Kriesi 1995).4 Under right-wing rule, social democrats are 
expected to ally with social movements in mobilizations against the incumbent 
government. If the political left is in power, the opposite occurs: Social move-
ments lose a powerful ally and their mobilization capacity is reduced. The social 
movements’ mobilization capacity is expected to be further reduced by the social 
movements’ anticipation of reforms, which should (at least) partially fulfill their 
demands. While protest levels are expected to be higher under right-wing than 
under left-wing governments, Koopmans and Rucht (1995) expect protest levels 
to be highest under mixed (i.e. coalition) governments. The right in government 
is seen to make external pressure ‘necessary,’ while the left in government 
makes protest ‘opportune,’ in the sense that protest will meet a receptive envi-
ronment. What is more, the political left might even actively seek support among 
4 Scholars examining the US case have found an inverse relationship between the 
government’s political leaning and the fate of left-wing movements (McAdam y Tarrow 2013). 
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social movements in order to exert pressure on the coalition partner (Kriesi 
1995: 182). 
The political exchange model and the political opportunity perspective 
converge on two arguments: a stable social democratic government is expected 
to reduce the levels of labor related contention, while the presence of a strong 
Communist party can potentially undo the pacifying effects of social democratic 
rule. The political opportunity perspective further examines the potential effects 
of mixed coalition governments and suggests that levels of left-wing contention 
could be even higher under a mixed than under a conservative government.
What strike and protest patterns can one expect when applying the above 
described economic and political models to the Spanish case? To be able to 
formulate some working hypotheses (see section 4), I now turn to the examined 
data and to their operationalization. 
3.  DATA SOURCES AND OPERATIONALIZATION
To examine the applicability of the different theoretical models to the Spa-
nish case, I relate economic and political changes (as independent variables) 
with the evolutions of strikes and street protests (as dependent variables). For the 
state of the economy, I mainly rely on employment and unemployment data pro-
vided by the Spanish National Statistics Institute and the OECD. For the political 
dimension, I examine the degree of unity of the left, the presence or absence of 
the left in government and the (majority or minority) role within the government.
As dependent variables I examine strikes and labor-related street protests 
(i.e. street protests called by workers, works committees or unions). The data on 
strikes is provided by the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security. 
To collect the data, the ministry applies a definition proposed by the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (1993: 2), which considers a strike as “a temporary 
work stoppage effected by one or more groups of workers with a view to enfor-
cing or resisting demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other workers 
in their demands or grievances.” All strikes are taken into account irrespective of 
whether or not they had been previously announced, as long as they exceed the 
duration of one hour. The data includes information about numbers of strikes, 
numbers of participants and numbers of working days lost due to strike actions. 
These variables are broken down according to different subcategories (e.g. re-
gions, economic sectors, strike motives, strike outcomes). There are, however, 
some important gaps in the data. While the data includes information for the 
nationwide general strike in 2002, no information is reported for the three later 
general strikes (one in 2010 and two in 2012) or for one nationwide strike of the 
public sector in 2010. The data on the three general strikes could be completed 
by drawing on works by other scholars (González y Luque 2014; Luque y Gon-
zález 2016).
Regarding street protests, I use data provided by the Spanish Ministry of the 
Interior. This ministry publishes yearly aggregate data on the exercise of funda-
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mental rights such as the right of assembly and demonstration. The data consi-
dered here include rallies and marches in the public sphere. Regarding these two 
modes of action, the ministry distinguishes between different types of organi-
zers, which makes it possible to isolate street protests called by workers, works 
committees or unions (here referred to as ‘labor-related street protests’ or simply 
‘labor protests’). For the period between 2000 and 2008, the ministry furthermo-
re distinguished between announced, unannounced and forbidden street protests 
and also provided data on the total numbers of participants for each protest type. 
In 2009, the numbers of participants were dropped for all types of protests and as 
of 2010, the unannounced demonstrations were also omitted. Over the time span 
under study, the ministry has thus become more selective regarding the data to 
be published on street protests, which leaves me with announced street protests 
as the only consistent value for the entire time span.
The operationalization of strike and protest activity is inspired by Shorter 
and Tilly’s concept of ‘shapes of strikes’ (1971; 1974), which is intended to 
go beyond the absolute numbers provided by the ministries. Initially applied to 
strikes, the notion distinguishes between three vectors: First, frequency, which 
is calculated by the total number of events over the population under study. 
Second, size, which is defined as the total number of participants over the total 
number of events. Third, duration, which is specified as the aggregate amount of 
time that individuals spent on the events over the total number of participants. 
Based on these three vectors, two more dimensions can be defined: magnitude, 
which results from the multiplication of size and duration; and volume, which is 
equal to a population’s total time spent on the events. 
The following equation illustrates the ‘shapes of strikes’ (Shorter y Tilly 
1971; 1974):
Strike volume = strike frequency x strike size x strike duration
This conceptualization has the advantage of making visible various aspects 
of contentious collective actions, which absolute numbers do not reflect. The 
identical magnitude or volume can in fact vary in its shape. For instance, as 
shown in Figure 1, high strike size combined with low strike duration can produ-
ce the same strike magnitude (or strike volume) as its counterpart.
Figure 1. Possible different shapes of the same strike volume (adaptation of 
Shorter and Tilly 1971; 1974).
b  b 
a = strike size 
b = strike duration
e = strike frequency 
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Because the Spanish Ministry of the Interior provides numbers of protesters 
only until 2009 and no information about the duration of protests, this study will 
mainly compare the respective frequencies of strikes and labor protests.
The official data examined here are the most comprehensive about strikes 
and street protests in Spain. However, these official data sets are far from depic-
ting an objective reality of social conflict in Spain. One reason for caution are the 
political purposes of official statistics (Camard 2002). Whether and how public 
ministries keep official records of certain social phenomena is in fact a result 
of political decisions. Regarding the Spanish case, the data on both strikes and 
street protests became more selective as of 2009. It seems reasonable to assume 
that political interests guided the decisions to omit information on the more con-
tentious actions such as general strikes or unannounced street protests. 
Technical aspects of the data collection procedure also lead to (sometimes 
unintended) biases (Franzosi 1989). In Spain, for instance, there is no obligation 
for companies to communicate the number of workers involved in strike action. 
For this reason, public administrations determine the number by consulting the 
company management, entrepreneurs’ associations, unions, or by producing their 
own surveys on the participation in strike action. It can be assumed that numbers 
provided by the employers’ side tend to minimize the impact (and thus the size) 
of strikes while the unions’ side is expected to boost these numbers. Since two 
out of three external sources are from the employers’ side, there is a risk that the 
numbers provided by the ministry tend to underestimate the impact of strikes. 
The vagueness regarding the collection of this information suggests handling 
with care the number of participants in strike action and the derived number of 
working days lost due to strikes.
4.  ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF LABOR
CONTENTION IN SPAIN
Having presented the theories and the data to be examined, I now proceed
to the actual analysis. In the following two sections, I separate the economic 
and the political dimensions of labor related contention. In order to relate the 
theoretical models with the Spanish case, I begin each section with an overview 
of the relevant (economic or political) evolutions in Spain, which allow me to 
formulate some working hypothesis. In both sections, I examine strikes and labor 
related street protests separately at first and then present a relational reading of 
the two modes of action. In a final section, I propose a short synthesis combining 
both economic and political factors in the analysis of strikes and labor related 
street protests. 
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4.1.  Economic dimensions of strikes and labor protests in Spain
For the time period under study (2000-2016), economists dealing with the 
Spanish case distinguish between a pre-crisis period (2000-2007), a crisis period 
(2008-2013) and a period of stagnation or ‘moderate recovery’ as of 2014 (Ban-
co de España 2017). Spanish labor market statistics reflect these three periods 
(see Table 1). The first eight-year period presents a relatively steady increase in 
the total number of persons employed. The unemployment rates at first oscillated 
between 10.6 percent and 11.5 percent, but showed a declining trend after 2003. 
This trend was reversed, still slightly in 2008 and sharply in 2009. After having 
reached peak values in 2 013, unemployment rates decreased again as of 2014 
and the total number of persons employed increased accordingly. 
Table 1. Employment levels and unemployment rates in Spain, 2000-2016.
Year Employment (EPA), in thousands Unemployment rate (Eurostat)
2000 12,286 (100.0%) 11.9%
2001 12,787 (104.1%) 10.6%
2002 13,142 (107.0%) 11.5%
2003 13,598 (110.7%) 11.5%
2004 14,721 (119.8%) 11.0%
2005 15,502 (126.2%) 9.2%
2006 16,208 (131.9%) 8.5%
2007 16,760 (136.4%) 8.2%
2008 16,681 (135.8%) 11.3%
2009 15,681 (127.6%) 17.9%
2010 15,347 (124.9%) 19.9%
2011 15,105 (123.0%) 21.4%
2012 14,573 (118.6%) 24.8%
2013 14,069 (114.5%) 26.1%
2014 14,286 (116.3%) 24.5%
2015 14,774 (120.2%) 22.1%
2016 15,228 (124.0%) 19.6%
Note: Values in brackets show the relative changes compared to the base year 2000. 
Sources: labor statistics from INE and OECD.
The Business Cycle Model predicts a positive relationship between eco-
nomic boom and strike activity. Thus, when applying the model to the above-
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described economic evolution, one can formulate the following hypothesis regar-
ding the levels of labor related contentious collective actions in Spain:
H1: The level of labor contention is expected to be high during the pre-
crisis period (2000-2007), low during the crisis period (2008-2013) and inter-
mediate during the period of moderate economic recovery (2014-2016).
Grievance Theory, expecting higher levels of contention during times of 
widespread relative deprivation, suggests a different hypothesis for the Spanish 
case:
H2: Regardless of the levels prior to the crisis, labor contention is expec-
ted to increase with the outbreak of the Great Recession and to lower again 
after 2014.
4.1.1. Strike activity contradicting the Business Cycle Model?
The different vectors of strikes have evolved unequally over time (see Table 
2). Furthermore, some vectors – notably strike size – vary greatly depending on 
whether or not general strikes are taken into account. In order to facilitate the 
subsequent interpretation, I first depict the evolution of the shape of strikes by 
omitting the general strikes and then show how the picture changes when they 
are included.
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Strike frequency—or the number of strikes per 100,000 employees—seems 
to be the only variable to show a specific crisis related pattern. It decreases from 
5.9 in 2000 to 4.3 in 2005 and remains relatively low during the remaining pre-
crisis period. The values increase with the outbreak of the economic crisis—still 
moderately in 2008 and sharply in 2009. Except for the year 2011, when the va-
lue drops to 5.1, strike frequency remains above 6 and reaches its peak in 2013, 
with 7.1 strikes per 100,000 employees. Frequency then decreases to 5.4 in 2014 
and further drops to 4.2 in both 2015 and 2016—the lowest levels of the entire 
time span under study. These tendencies are also reflected in the mean values 
for the three periods under study: An intermediate value of 5 strikes per 100,000 
employees for the pre-crisis period, a mean of 6 for the crisis period and a low of 
4.6 for the post-crisis period. 
For strike size—i.e. the number of strikers per strike—a general trend 
towards smaller strikes can be observed. The millennium starts with a strike size 
close to 3000 strikers per strike—a value that remains unparalleled during the 
remaining time span under study. Already during the pre-crisis period, the values 
decrease and reach levels between 490 and 790 workers per strike in the years 
2004 to 2007. Values remain similar during the first two years of the crisis, but 
then drop to values between 280 and 460 workers per strike. In the post-crisis 
period, finally, strike size remains low and does not exceed 290 workers per 
strike.
Strike duration is the vector with the most inconclusive pattern, which is also 
reflected in the mean strike durations of the three periods: In all three periods, 
strikers struck for a mean duration of 2.6 days (if general strikes are left aside). 
All but two values range between 1.1 and 2.9 days per striker. Only in 2004 and 
2012, the values reach higher levels, i.e. 8 and 4 days, respectively. While strikes 
have generally lasted longer in 2012, the value for 2004 results from a single, 
extraordinarily long-lasting strike in the agricultural sector in Andalusia. This 
single strike accounts for more than two thirds of the working days lost in that 
year.5
Since strike magnitude results from multiplying strike size and strike du-
ration, the tendency towards smaller strike size combined with the indistinct 
pattern of strike duration also translates into a tendency towards smaller strike 
magnitude. The same decreasing tendency can also be observed for strike volu-
mes—despite the addition of strike frequency as a further multiplication factor. 
The fact that strike volumes decrease with the crisis period indicates that the 
increase in strike frequency during that same period could not compensate for 
the decrease in strike size.
The picture changes when the four general strikes (in 2002, 2010, and two in 
2012) are taken into account. Strike size and, to a lesser extent, strike duration 
are affected by the inclusion of general strikes. Not surprisingly, mean strike size 
5 However, the high value might also result from inflated numbers provided by the unions. In 
its comments on the 2004 numbers, the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security made 
an unusually explicit reference to the (union) source of these high values.
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increases in the periods with general strikes. The fact that three out of four gene-
ral strikes occurred during the second period under study also undoes the above-
described tendency towards smaller strikes. With a mean of 2,043 workers per 
strike, the second period now exceeds the mean of the first period (1,852 workers 
per strike) and the drop between the second and the third period is much greater. 
Strike duration decreases in both periods with general strikes, since all general 
strikes lasted only one day (i.e. less than the average strike duration when omit-
ting general strikes). Here again, the effect is greater in the second period, where 
three general strikes occurred. Mean strike duration decreases from 2.5 days per 
striker in the first period to 1.9 during the crisis period and increases to 2.6 in the 
post-crisis period.
As a consequence of the higher values of strike size, means of both strike 
magnitude and strike volume also increase during the first two periods. Regar-
ding strike size, the gap between the first two periods under study gets smaller 
(with 3,271 working days lost per strike during the first period and 2,752 during 
the second) and would actually be reversed if the outlier case in 2004 were left 
aside. The mean strike volume of the second period (166 working days lost per 
1,000 employees) almost equalizes the pre-crisis period (169 working days lost 
per 1,000 employees). This points at the impact of the increase in strike frequen-
cy during the second period. Including the general strikes not only substantially 
increases the mean strike magnitudes and volumes of the first two periods, it 
also amplifies the drop between the second and the third period, since no general 
strike occurred during the last three years under study. 
Based on these numbers, some tentative conclusions can be drawn regarding 
the relationship between the state of the economy and strike activity. One finds 
that there is a distinct crisis-related pattern only for strike frequency. Not only 
is the average strike frequency highest during the crisis period (6.0 strikes per 
100,000 employees); that same six-year period also includes the four highest 
strike frequencies of the seventeen years under study. When including general 
strikes, the crisis period is furthermore characterized by an increase in strike 
size, but lower strike duration. At first sight, these numbers thus seem to contra-
dict the Business Cycle Model, which predicts a decrease in strike activity—and 
notably strike frequency—during a crisis period. The increase in strike frequency 
and strike size during the crisis rather tends to provide support for the Grievance 
Theory.
4.1.2. A proliferation of labor-related street protests during the economic crisis
Is there a similar crisis related pattern for labor related street protests? As 
mentioned above, the study of street protests is limited to the frequency of 
announced street protests (the only consistent value for the entire time period 
under study). Rallies and marches organized by workers, works committees or 
trade unions account for a considerable share of the total number of announced 
street protests in Spain. As shown in Table 3, this share varied over time and was 
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highest during the crisis period, when every other announced street protest was 
called by workers, works committees or trade unions. 
Table 3. Labor related street protests between 2000 and 2016 in Spain.
Year Labor related street protests
Labor related 
street protests 
as share of total 
street protests
Frequency of labor 
related street pro-
tests   
(per 100,000 emplo-
yees)
2000 1304 0.32 11
2001 1654 0.35 13
2002 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 1551 0.38 11
2004 1532 0.41 10
2005 1338 0.35 8
2006 1650 0.41 10
2007 1860 0.41 11
Mean 2000-2007 1556 0.38 10
2008 4249 0.49 26
2009 7797 0.42 50
2010 11190 0.51 72
2011 9293 0.44 61
2012 26520 0.60 186
2013 23517 0.54 167
Mean 2008-2013 13761 0.50 94
2014 17383 0.47 120
2015 14532 0.44 97
2016 11554 0.41 75
Mean 2014-2016 14490 0.44 97
Mean 2000-2016 7541 0.41 67
Note: No data is available for 2002. Frequencies are calculated with employment numbers from Table 1.
Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior; own calculation
Frequency of labor related street protests, i.e. the number of labor related 
street protests per 100,000 employees, varied considerably over the time span 
under study. During the pre-crisis period, the frequency of announced labor pro-
tests oscillated between 8 and 13 protests per 100,000 employees. In 2008, pro-
test frequency reached a level of 26—twice as high as the highest level registe-
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red during the pre-crisis period. Apart from the year 2011, when the frequency of 
labor related street protests experienced a drop, the values continued to increase, 
reaching their highest level (186) in 2012. Beginning in 2013, protest frequency 
started to decrease, with the biggest drop experienced between 2013 and 2014. 
However, protest frequencies remained high after 2014.
When comparing the three periods en bloc, one finds the lowest mean fre-
quency of labor related protests for the pre-crisis period, for which a mean of 
10 labor related street protests were counted for 100,000 employees. This value 
increased more than nine-fold during the crisis period (94) and reached an even 
slightly higher level during the post-crisis period (97). Similar to the observation 
for strikes, the strong increase in protest frequency during the crisis period also 
appears to be in stark opposition to the Business Cycle Model. 
4.1.3. A shift towards more defensive and isolated strikes as well as towards 
less costly modes of action
So far, the findings of increasing strike and protest frequencies during the 
crisis period seem to contradict the Business Cycle Model. However, one has to 
take into account that strikes and street protests did not move in parallel: After 
the outbreak of the Great Recession, frequency of labor protests increased more 
strongly than strike frequence. Unlike the levels of strikes, levels of street pro-
tests also remained high during the post-crisis period. 
Looking at strike motives helps to understand the comparatively modest 
increase in strike frequency during the crisis period. The Spanish Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security distinguishes between ‘collective bargaining-
related’, ‘other work-related’ and ‘not strictly work-related’ strikes—the latter 
referring to union-related strikes, solidarity strikes, or strikes against policy re-
forms. Figure 2 shows that the frequency of these three types of strikes evolved 
unequally over time. A general (but unsteady) downward trend can be observed 
for the frequency of collective-bargaining-related strikes. The frequency of other 
work related strikes sharply increased in 2009, remained high until 2013 and 
showed again lower values as from 2014. The frequency of not strictly work-
related strikes remained rather low throughout the entire period—2014 being the 
only year that stands out with a peak value almost twice as high as the second 
highest value (measured in 2012). It becomes clear from Figure 2 that the ge-
neral increase in strike frequency observed for the crisis period can largely be 
attributed to the increase in work (but not collective bargaining) related strikes. 
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Figure 2. Strike frequency according to strike motives
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security; own calculations 
The work (but not collective bargaining) related strikes can be further di-
vided into ‘defensive,’ ‘offensive’ and ‘other’ strikes.6 Defensive strikes aim 
at preventing or undoing layoffs or deterioration of working conditions. Here, 
they include strikes against non-payment of wages, industrial restructuring, staff 
downsizing plans, the company’s non-compliance with labor and employment 
laws as well as strikes against disciplinary measures adopted by the company 
(including dismissals of single workers). Offensive strikes strive for improve-
ments of employment conditions. The data provides two motives that can be 
assigned to those offensive motives: ‘improvements independent from collective 
agreements’ and ‘improvements for staffs not covered by collective agreements.’ 
Finally, ‘other’ strike motives include all those that cannot easily be categorized 
into either offensive or defensive strikes. The following strike motives were 
categorized as ‘other’: workflow-related strikes, strikes due to labor-related ac-
cidents, and ‘other’ strike motives. 
The analysis of the data shows that the share of defensive strikes approxima-
tely doubled in the course of the economic crisis (see Figure 3).7 This increase 
in defensive strike motives was accompanied by a decrease in “offensive” strike 
6 I do not consider the collective bargaining related strikes because they can be both offensive 
and defensive in nature.
7 Unfortunately, the categories used by the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Se-
curity in order to distinguish strike motives were modified in 2014. For this reason, conclusions re-
garding the defensive or offensive nature of strikes can only be drawn for the period 2000 to 2013.
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motives. At their peak, offensive strikes accounted for up fourteen percent of 
work (but not collective bargaining) related strikes. After 2008, they remained 
below the five percent level. However, the relative increase in defensive strikes 
went mostly at the expense of ‘other’ strikes. 
Figure 3. Share of offensive, defensive and “other” strike motives for work related 
strikes between 2000-2013.
Note: Collective bargaining is excluded because it can be both offensive and defensive in nature. As from 2014, the data no longer allows to categorize the 
strike into defensive and offensive strikes. 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security; own calculations.
These findings suggest that the underlying assumption of the Business Cycle 
Model might still apply. The decreasing share of offensive and ‘other’ strikes in-
deed indicates that the workers’ strike propensity decreased with the outbreak of 
the crisis. However, the workers’ decreased propensity to go on strike seems to 
have been overcompensated by an increasing number of circumstances in which 
defensive strike actions became a means of last resort—most notably in cases of 
non-payment of wages or mass layoffs.
Another way to look at the unequal evolutions of strike and protest frequen-
cies is to put them in a direct relationship with one another. The unequal increa-
ses suggest that there has been an overall shift in the way workers’ expressed 
their discontent (see Figure 4). During the pre-crisis period, labor related street 
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protests were roughly twice as frequent as strikes. In 2008, protests were already 
more than four times as frequent than strikes and this ratio continued to increase 
until 2012, when it reached a ratio of about 31 to 1. Although the relative share 
of strikes reached again slightly higher levels as of 2013, strikes remained (rela-
tively seen) far less used than prior to the crisis. It becomes visible that the crisis 
was accompanied by a clear shift away from strikes towards labor protests in the 
streets.
Figure 4. Relative share of strike frequency and protest frequency among overall 
frequency of labor related contentious collective actions in Spain between 2000 
and 2016.
Note: No data is available for 2002.
Source: MESS, Spanish Ministry of the Interior; own calculation
The Business Cycle Model provides a possible explanation for the workers’ 
shift away from strikes to street protests. As the previous analysis of strike mo-
tives indicates, strikes increasingly became a means of last resort. It actually 
seems that the workers—weakened in their bargaining position—increasingly 
resorted to less costly actions such as street protests. Rather than contradictory, 
the Business Cycle Model and Grievance Theory thus seem to complement one 
another. The latter provides a possible explanation for the overall increase in 
labor related contention during the economic crisis. The former provides a cre-
dible explanation for the workers’ shift away from strikes to labor related street 
protests.
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The economic perspectives have helped to better understand some dimen-
sions of industrial conflict—notably frequencies of both strikes and labor related 
protests—between 2000 and 2016 in Spain. Yet, there remain some unresolved 
issues. The general strikes (and notably their impact on strike size) are one such 
issue. Because of their very nature, these strikes call for a different reading. As 
Gall (2012: 682) puts it, ‘[t]he primary purpose of the mass strike is not to im-
pose economic costs upon the employer (as a stand-alone strike with a private 
employer primarily attempts to do) but rather impose a political cost on the 
government.’ In order to understand the occurrence of general strikes, one thus 
has to expand the focus and include the political dimensions of labor contention. 
The high frequency of labor-related street protests during the post-crisis period is 
another unresolved issue. Why did strike frequencies decline again to pre-crisis 
levels while the frequencies of labor related street protests remained high—on 
average even higher than during the crisis period? A closer look at the political 
dimensions of labor related contentious collective actions might provide some 
further insights. 
4.2.  POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF STRIKES AND LABOR 
PROTESTS IN THE STREETS
After almost 40 years of fascist dictatorship and the so-called transition to 
democracy in the late 1970’s, Spain was characterized by a de-facto two-party 
system during most of its democratic period. Since the election of the social de-
mocratic Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) into government in 1982, the 
social democrats alternated one-party rule with the conservative People’s Party 
(PP).8 The social democrats governed between 1982-1996 and again between 
2004-2011, and the conservatives between 1996-2004 and again between 2011 
and the end of the time frame under study. However, the two parties had absolu-
te majorities only between 1982 and 1986 (PSOE) and between 2000 and 2004 
(PP). During the other mandates, the governing parties depended on “pivotal” 
parties capable of determining the majority in parliament. The ex-communist 
United Left (IU) and different regionalist and nationalist parties such as the 
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), or the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and 
Convergence and Union (CiU) in Catalonia repeatedly played such roles (Orriols 
2013: 362). 
Although the one-party rule was upheld until 2016 (the end of the time frame 
under study), the Spanish political landscape and the conditions for government 
formation were radically transformed by the December 2015 General Elections. 
Two political parties—We Can (Podemos) and Citizens (Ciudadanos, Cs)—
broke the two-party system open, gaining 21 and 14 percent of the votes, res-
pectively. In the aftermath of the election, no candidate for prime minister was 
8 Although the name “People’s Party” was only given in 1989, as a result of a re-foundation 
of the post-Francoist People’s Alliance (Alianza Popular).
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capable of securing sufficient support for his election by the Congress of Depu-
ties. The incumbent prime minister Mariano Rajoy (PP) provisionally remained 
in office and new General Elections were held in June 2016. In these elections, 
the Popular Party recovered some of its losses from 2015 and was ultimately 
able to secure another government mandate due to the support of Citizens and 
the abstention of the majority of the social democrats.
The union landscape, for its part, remained rather stable during the time 
frame under study. Over the entire period, the two major unions—the Workers’ 
Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, CCOO) and the General Union of Workers 
(Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT)—constantly accumulated more than two 
thirds of the votes at trade union elections (Beneyto 2018). According to the Po-
litical Exchange Model and the Political Opportunity Perspective, changes in the 
party in power can be expected to affect the major unions’ propensity to resort 
to contentious collective actions. In both models, the frequency and size of labor 
related contentious collective actions are expected to reach higher levels under a 
conservative government. 
H3: Frequency and size of labor related contention were higher during the 
periods of conservative government (2002-2004 & 2012-2016) than during 
the years of social democratic government (2004-2011).
Regarding the presence or absence of a strong Communist left, the principal 
player to consider at a country scale is the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), 
which was the third political force in parliament during much of the 1990s. 
During the 2000s, however, the party suffered strong electoral losses and was 
no longer able to form a parliamentary group on its own during two legislative 
terms (2004-2011). In 2011, IU could temporarily reverse the downward trend. 
Yet, it remained far below its strength of the 1990s. In the December 2015 gene-
ral elections, Podemos entered the national political arena as a new contender on 
the left, coming up closely to the Social Democratic party in numbers of votes.9 
For the June 2016 elections, Podemos and the United Left formed an electoral 
alliance together with other left-wing parties. Yet, the correlation of forces on 
the political left remained largely unaffected by the formation of this new elec-
toral alliance. In sum, for the time period under study, there was only a strong 
left-wing contender in 2016. Yet, Podemos did not identify itself with classical 
communist categories such as the ‘working class.’ For this reason, I do not inclu-
de the factor of a strong Communist left in my analysis.
Drawing on yearly data makes impossible to draw clear lines between the 
periods of social democratic and conservative rule. Hence, I approximate the 
period of conservative and social democratic government: The years 2000-2003 
9 Yet, not in numbers of deputies: Podemos obtaining 20.7 percent of the votes (compared 
to 22 percent for the social democratic party), but only 69 seats (compared to 90 for the social 
democratic party).
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and 2012-2016 are attributed to the Popular Party,10 and the remaining years 
(2004-2011) to the social democratic party.
4.2.1. A tendency towards more demonstrative strikes under conservative 
governments
In both the political exchange model and the political opportunity perspec-
tive, one can expect strike frequency and strike size—and ultimately also strike 
magnitude and strike volumes—to be greater under conservative governments. A 
preliminary look at the data seems to support this hypothesis (see Table 4). Mean 
strike frequency is higher under conservative governments (mean of 5.4 strikes 
per 100,000 workers compared to 5.2 strikes per 100,000 workers under social 
democratic regime). Yet, the difference is only slight.
10 No government could be formed after the December 2015 elections. Because Mariano 
Rajoy (PP) remained formally in office between the elections in December 2015 and those in June 
2016 and since he was reconfirmed as prime minister in October 2016, the year 2016 is also at-
tributed to the Popular Party.
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Inclusion of general strikes amplifies the differences between social demo-
cratic and conservative governments. Of the four general strikes, three took place 
under conservative administrations (one in 2002 and two in 2012) and one under 
social democratic government (in 2010). Under conservative administrations, 
strikes counted about three times as many participants as under the social demo-
cratic administration. At the same time, they were nearly a day shorter. Means of 
both strike magnitude and strike volume under conservative administrations are 
also about one and a half times higher than in the social democratic period. This 
indicates that the increase in strike size under conservative administrations more 
than outweighs the decrease in strike duration. 
Under conservative administrations, strikes have thus taken a more de-
monstrative character (i.e. short but massive). This is generally in line with the 
political perspectives examined in this paper. The stronger bonds between major 
unions and social democrats (Political Exchange Model) or the major unions’ an-
ticipation of reforms (Political Opportunity Perspective) seem to reduce massive 
strike action during periods of social democratic government.
More surprising is the proximity of the strike frequencies between conser-
vative and social democratic regimes. Under the PSOE, a mean of 5.2 strikes 
per 100,000 workers occurred, while the mean value for the conservatives (5.4 
strikes per 100,000 workers) is only slightly higher. This invites one to have a 
closer look at the evolution of strike frequency. Figure 5 shows that both incum-
bent parties faced the highest levels of strike frequency during the crisis period. 
The parties also experienced the lowest strike frequencies either prior to the cri-
sis (PSOE) or after the crisis period (PP). These parallels account for the similar 
strike frequencies between the two parties. 
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Figure 5. Number of strikes and strike frequency (per 100,000 workers) between 
2000 and 2016.
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security; own calculations.
Changes in the political party were thus accompanied by stronger changes 
in strike size than in strike frequency.11 There is one year, however, where strike 
frequency seems to have been affected by a political exchange. Figure 5 shows 
in fact a considerable dip in both absolute and relative numbers of strikes for 
2011. This dip cannot be explained in economic terms: unemployment levels 
were still on rise and the numbers of companies affected by mass layoffs also 
reached a new peak in 2011. From an economic perspective, there is thus little 
reason to expect a sudden (and intermittent) drop in strike frequency. A political 
exchange between major unions and the social democratic government might 
provide a more plausible explanation. In 2011, the social democratic government 
faced in fact a delicate situation: it was seeking reelection while being confron-
ted with strong challenges by the 15-M movement in the streets. One explanation 
for the drop in strike frequency could thus be that the major unions deliberately 
11 However, a stronger relationship between the political party in power and strike frequency 
becomes visible when political perspectives are combined with the economic ones (see section 
XX).
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sought to reduce the numbers strikes in order to lower the pressure on the social 
democratic party and to favor its reelection. 
4.2.2. Higher levels of labor protests under conservative governments
A look at the data on street protests shows that labor related street protests 
were both more numerous and more frequent under conservative governments 
(see Table 5). The ratio is about 2.5 for the absolute numbers and 2.7 for protest 
frequencies. 
Table 5. Numbers and frequencies of labor related protests according to political 
party in power
Protests organized by wor-
kers, works committees or 
unions
Frequency of protests or-








Note: No data is available for 2002.
Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior; own calculation
Compared to strike frequency, where only a slight variation could be ob-
served between the social democratic and the conservative period, labor related 
protest frequencies thus appear to vary more widely depending on the political 
party in power. The findings for labor related street protests are thus in line with 
the hypothesis of heightened levels of labor related contention under conserva-
tive governments.
A closer look at the evolution of protest frequencies shows why protest fre-
quencies vary more widely than strike frequencies. Similar to strike frequencies, 
labor related street protests experienced a steep increase with the outbreak of the 
economic crisis (see Figure 6). Yet, contrary to strike frequency, these protest 
frequency experienced another sharp increase after Mariano Rajoy (PP) was 
elected prime minister in December 2011. Furthermore, although protest fre-
quency declined during the post-crisis period (a similar trend to strike frequen-
cy), it remained comparatively high (unlike strike frequency). These differences 
account for the greater variation in protest frequencies than in strike frequencies 
depending on the party in power.
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Note: No data is available for 2002.
Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior; own calculation
The graph for protest frequency shows another similarity with that of strike 
frequency: the dip in 2011. This further supports the hypothesis that the major 
unions might have actively slowed the public expression of labor related conten-
tion in order to reduce the pressure on the incumbent social democratic govern-
ment during the election year. 
In sum, the findings obtained in this section suggest that labor related con-
tention had a more demonstrative character under conservative governments: 
Strikes were more massive, but shorter and labor related street protests more 
frequent under conservative governments. 
4.3.  Relating political and economic models
The economic and political analyses of labor related contentious collective 
actions have produced important insights. The findings show that the economic 
crisis was accompanied by increases in both strike and labor related protest fre-
quencies. They furthermore reveal that strikes were more massive but shorter 
and labor related protests more frequent under conservative governments. Com-
bining the two perspectives shows that labor contention peaked during the crisis 
years with a conservative government (see Table 6).
Figure 6. Frequencies of labor related protests between 2000 and 2016 in Spain.
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Table 6. Strike frequency, strike size and protest frequency according to economic 
period and political party in power.





















5.5 6.6 4.6 3060 4061 281 11.3 176.2 97.4
Notes: For street protests, no data is available for 2002.
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, Spanish Ministry of the Interior; own calculation.
The second highest frequency values are reported for the crisis period with 
a social democratic government. This suggests that frequencies are more related 
to economic than to political factors. A different picture emerges regarding strike 
size, where the value for the pre-crisis period with a conservative government 
exceed the crisis-value of the social democratic government. Overall, the fin-
dings indicate that the economic and political perspectives are most meaningful 
if they are combined. 
5.  CONCLUSION
In this article, I presented a relational analysis of strikes and labor-related
street protests between 2000 and 2016 in Spain. To this end, I examined aggre-
gate data provided by Spanish ministries and combined theories on industrial 
conflict with theories on social movements. More specifically, I discussed the 
respective economic and political models of contention and examined the extent 
to which they contribute to a better understanding of labor contention in the re-
cent history of Spain. 
The findings show that one can make both an economic and a political rea-
ding of the evolution of strikes and labor protests in Spain. With respect to the 
economic reading, the results indicate that the economic crisis (2008-2013) was 
accompanied by an increase in the frequency of labor-related contention. This 
finding can be seen as being in line with Grievance Theory in social movement 
studies, since the theory expects higher levels of contention in times of economic 
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distress. Yet, at the same time, this increase was unequal for strikes and labor 
protests. Mean strike frequency rose by one fifth during the crisis period. Mean 
labor protest frequency, however, grew more than ninefold. Thus, in relative 
terms, one finds that workers reduced their use of strikes in favor of street pro-
tests. This in turn can be seen as being in line with the Business Cycle Model in 
research on industrial conflict. Regarding the political dimension of labor con-
tention, I could show that strike size and strike duration considerably varied with 
changes in government. In periods of conservative governments, strikes tended 
to be shorter but more massive. In other words, the strikes took a more demons-
trative character (Gall 2012; Gallas, Nowak y Wilde 2012). Finally, imbricating 
economic and political perspectives shows that strike size and the frequencies 
of both strikes and labor protests were highest during the years of crisis under 
conservative government. One conclusion becomes evident: looking at strikes 
(or street protests) alone does not only lead to a partial view of labor contention, 
it can also result in interpretations that are entirely wrong. 
Future studies could extend the here presented macrological analysis of labor 
contention in Spain by including meso- and micrological processes. Thereby, 
greater emphasis could be given to (de-)mobilizing effects of shifts and changes 
happening within the “space of social movements” (Mathieu 2021)—notably 
the emergence of the 15-M or the Mareas (Spanish for “tides). Including these 
processes would further enrich the analysis and potentially qualify some of the 
here presented findings.
The present analysis is a strong call for a greater empirical and theoretical 
dialogue between research on industrial conflict and studies of social move-
ments. The two research areas might sometimes conflict with one another, but, 
above all, they have proven to be mutually enriching. Relating the study of 
strikes with the study of labor protests thus seems an effective means to better 
understand the ebbs and flows of the respective modes of action. 
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